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s Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) point out, factors that affect 
economic  development  can  be  classified  using  a  two-tier  approach. 
Based on a standard production function, inputs such as labor and physi-
cal and human capital directly affect per capita income. Much of the empirical 
cross-country growth literature has focused on these covariates. But the factors 
themselves are the product of deeper and more fundamental determinants and, 
thus, are at best proximate factors of economic development. The deeper deter-
minants fall into two broad categories: internal and external. Among the former, 
institutions and geography have received the most attention, while international 
trade has been the focus of the latter.1 The main purpose of this paper is to add 
an external factor, namely measures of migration, to the existing geography-
institutions-trade setup and to evaluate its contribution to the observed differ-
ences in per capita income across countries.
Geography refers to the physical location of a nation and the various physical 
characteristics it is endowed with (for instance, distance from the equator, access 
to sea, agro-climatic zone, disease environment, soil type, and natural resources). 
A country’s size, access to sea, and general topography can crucially affect trans-
port costs and the extent of its integration with the world. Climate and soil affect 
the types of crops planted. Interestingly, geography may even contribute to the 
nature of a country’s early institutions (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1998; Sachs 
2003). Thus, geography is an obvious choice as an essential factor that shapes the 
course of a nation’s development.
 The role of institutions for development can be directly linked to the work 
of Douglass North (1993; 1994a, b, c). North’s motivation was the inability of 
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across countries. If only factor accumulation led to progress, all countries would 
advance, provided the payoffs are high enough. Since progress is absent in many 
countries, the payoffs must be different for different countries—and institutions 
may be the reason for the differences (North 1994a). Institutions define the rules 
of the game that determine the incentives people face and the choices they make. 
An alternative way of looking at institutions is through the transaction-cost ap-
proach. Well-defined rules and their smooth enforcement—for example, better 
institutional quality—greatly reduce transaction costs faced by economic agents 
and, thus, lead to more efficient economic outcomes (North 1993; 1994b). One 
of the first studies to carefully examine the impact of institutions on productivity 
levels across countries was Hall and Jones (1999). Unlike geography, however, 
there is a potential endogeneity problem with institutions that needs to be ad-
dressed in the empirical investigation. 
International trade may affect economic development in several ways. In 
addition to gains from specialization in production based on comparative cost 
advantages, trade can make available new technologies and ideas, which, in turn, 
enhance total factor productivity. Moreover, operating in a larger market allows 
firms to take advantage of economies of scale and consumers to take advantage 
of a larger variety of goods. The empirical literature on the international trade-
development nexus is extensive, but a few papers stand out. Sachs and Warner 
(1995) construct an openness index and find that greater openness leads to higher 
growth. Similarly, Frankel and Romer (1999) find that international trade plays an 
important role in explaining cross-country differences in economic performance. 
Since trade measures, too, are likely to be endogenous, the authors construct an 
instrument for trade using a gravity-type model that explains the volume of trade 
between countries through their joint economic size and the distance between 
them. 
Migration can affect development in numerous ways, such as changes in the 
cost of labor, the loss or gain of human capital, knowledge spillovers, or work-
ers’ remittances. While empirical literature on the impact of remittances is fairly 
extensive,2 fewer studies examine the role of emigration of skilled workers (brain 
drain) or the potential brain gain due to migration (Beine, Docquier, and Rapo-
port 2001). 
This study indicates that both internal and external determinants matter for 
development. The internal measures—institutions and geography—exhibit the 
expected signs and are typically statistically significant, but they differ in their 
economic impact. Institutional measures appear to have large elasticity estimates, 
while geography measures are rather small. Among the external determinants, 
trade measures and the foreign-born population share (destination-country mea-
sure) exhibit the expected signs and are significant in most specifications. Inter-
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observed variation in per capita income across countries unless the sample is 
restricted to the top half of all countries receiving remittances. In that case, remit-
tances have a positive impact on economic development.
In the next section, we provide an overview of the literature on trade, mi-
gration, and development. In the sections that follow, we describe the empiri-
cal models used, discuss the data set, and present and interpret the empirical 
results.
Review of the Literature 
In this section, we review the literature on the trade, migration, and develop-
ment nexus. We begin with the welfare and labor market implications of migra-
tion as well as a brief discussion of political economy issues related to migra-
tion. We then investigate the special relationship between trade and migration in 
the context of their joint effect on economic development. Finally, we review a 
number of papers that examine the impact of both migration and trade within a 
regional context. 
Migration and Development
Welfare Effects of Immigration. From an empirical standpoint, there is no 
agreement on the gains or losses from immigration at the aggregate (national) 
level for either destination or source country. Martin (2003) maintains that eco-
nomic gain from the current level of immigration in the United States is small, 
and even doubling the number of entering migrants would not make a great deal 
of difference. Head and Ries (1998) suggest in passing that immigration lowers 
transaction costs and generates trade gains that would not have been realized 
otherwise. In a welfare analysis, Razin and Sadka (1997) determine that those left 
behind in the source country lose, landlords in the destination country gain, and 
wage earners in the destination country lose, though their loss is less than the 
gain of the landlords. 
While the Razin and Sadka findings—like the majority of studies in the mi-
gration literature3—suggest a net gain in the destination country, an empirical 
study by Davis and Weinstein (2002) finds that U.S. natives collectively suffer a 
$72 billion loss per year due to migration, roughly equal to 0.8 percent of gross 
domestic product. Davis and Weinstein argue that immigration increases the out-
put of the destination country while decreasing the output of the source country. 
The net effect in the U.S. is deterioration of trade as prices for U.S. goods go 
down while those of foreign goods go up. Furthermore, gains that accrue to the 
immigrants’ source country may be greater than the loss sustained by the destina-
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Labor Market Effects of Migration. A key result of the Heckscher–Ohlin 
model is the Rybczynski theorem, which states that a difference in a country’s 
endowment of labor will be reflected in its output of goods. Gandal, Hanson, and 
Slaughter (2000) cast some doubt on the empirical validity of the theorem in a 
case study of Israeli immigration. In the early 1990s, Israel experienced a massive 
influx of highly skilled Russian immigrants (relative to the Israeli population). Cu-
riously, this did not significantly depress the wages of Israeli workers. The authors 
show that the mix of output in Israel did not change during this period to reflect 
the change in labor composition. The most skill-intensive industries were not 
always the fastest growing. Instead, a global wave of skill-biased technological 
change helped Israel adjust to such a shock in factor supply. In fact, the change in 
production technology was such that the effective supply of skilled labor in Israel 
decreased even as its raw supply increased. The technological advances could 
have come to Israel from the United States through bilateral trade, capital flows, 
and government activities. 
Interestingly, in a related study using U.S. state-level data, Hanson and Slaugh-
ter (2002) find evidence in support of the Rybczynski effects.
Political Economy of Immigration. Rising differentials in global per capita 
income and advances in technology and transportation have contributed to an 
upsurge in international migration flows. Russell and Teitelbaum (1992) find this 
increase is most dramatic among illegal migrants. Futhermore, migration move-
ments have become not only greater but also more volatile and unpredictable 
and are accompanied by significant remittance flows. They also play a role in the 
trade of many services previously considered “nontradable.”
This trend raises concerns in wealthy countries, where the native populace is 
often resistant to immigration because of its potential to depress wages, displace 
native workers, or benefit from wealth redistribution tax schemes. Dolmas and 
Huffman (2004) model the behavior of a voting population when it decides on 
the level of immigration. A critical determinant is the native’s initial wealth level. 
Those endowed with relatively more capital will allow maximum immigration 
because the influx of migrants raises the marginal product of capital. Natives 
endowed with relatively less capital have to rely comparatively more on labor for 
their income, and since immigration erodes the marginal product of labor, poorer 
natives’ optimal decision is to allow zero migration. Interestingly, the natives’ 
collective decision is associated with the population’s level of wealth inequality: 
Greater inequality is likely to lead to a no-immigration policy, while inequality 
that approaches zero can bring a maximum-immigration policy. In the survey 
article by Razin and Sadka (1997), the potential loss suffered by the native popu-
lation in a welfare state through wealth redistribution tax policies is given as a 
possible reason for native resistance to immigration. The Dolmas and Huffman 
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the number of voting immigrants approaches 100 percent of the original popula-
tion. However, the tax rate rises significantly once immigrants outnumber natives. 
Razin and Sadka also mention that the reallocation of investment from physical to 
human capital further erodes native welfare. 
The Relationship Between Trade and Migration
Migration and Trade as Substitutes. If the fear is tenacious that immigra-
tion may result in losses for the host country, the Heckscher–Ohlin model sug-
gests one approach for reducing the flow: The unimpeded movement of goods 
will lead to the equalization of factor prices, and that will remove an incentive 
for labor to move from one country to another. Horiba (2000) finds empirical 
evidence of the Heckscher–Ohlin theory. He shows that the convergence toward 
a more similar relative labor supply (which would equalize wages) is limited 
in magnitude, perhaps due to the costs associated with migration. Instead, the 
trade in goods, which can be considered trade in the factors that produced these 
goods, follows the same path as one would expect the factors to move according 
to Heckscher–Ohlin. 
Migration and Trade as Complements. Razin and Sadka (1997) point out 
that trade and immigration are substitutes only under the somewhat restrictive 
conditions of the Heckscher–Ohlin framework, allowing for country differences 
in the relative factor endowments only. For countries that differ in other as-
pects—technology, for example—free trade cannot equalize factor prices and 
may even widen factor price differentials. Immigration will allow each country to 
further specialize in the goods in which it has a technological advantage, leading 
to complementarity between trade and migration. 
Helliwell (1997) and Head and Ries (1998) both offer empirical evidence 
that trade and migration are complementary insofar as migration is capable of 
facilitating trade. Specifically, Head and Ries find that a 10 percent increase in 
immigration in Canada is associated with a 3 percent increase in imports and a 1 
percent increase in exports to the immigrant’s source country. They attribute this 
finding to two factors: Immigrants may have a preference for goods produced at 
home, and immigrants’ knowledge about their home economies can lower the 
cost of foreign trade. However, the authors note that the tendency for immigration 
to increase imports more than exports creates a decrease in net exports, which 
can translate into currency depreciation and a loss of welfare for the destination 
country, though such a loss can be offset by social and economic gains that ac-
crue from increased diversity.
Migration and Trade as Complements in the Short Run and Substi-
tutes in the Long Run. Two recent papers, both theoretical in nature, conjecture 
that the relationship between trade and migration depends on the time horizon of 
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agglomerative, creating a manufacturing core that attracts labor from the country 
of origin (an argument earlier posited by Krugman 1991), but as trade liberaliza-
tion continues, the cost of trade becomes sufficiently low that a manufacturing 
core loses its advantages and some labor shifts back to the periphery. Ludema 
and Wooton emphasize the importance of timing revealed by this diversifica-
tion–agglomeration–diversification pattern and suggest that countries in the midst 
of liberalizing trade ought to restrict labor mobility until agglomerative forces 
weaken.
Lopez and Schiff (1998) deconstruct migration patterns by skill composition 
in a small, labor-abundant developing economy after unilateral trade liberaliza-
tion. Initial liberalization does not have much effect on the movement of skilled 
labor, but it does increase the number of unskilled workers leaving the country. 
The total labor force decreases, though the average skill level of the remaining 
population rises. Once trade has become substantially liberalized, the number of 
unskilled emigrants decreases and the total labor force stabilizes. This result is 
consistent with the pattern described above: a temporary spike in migration fol-
lowed by a stabilization of migration flow. 
Immigration and Trade: Regional Analysis
Taylor (1995) looks at the Asia–Pacific region and, in particular, the determi-
nants of the region’s relatively high economic growth rates. His empirical findings 
point to the high investment rate, primarily imported capital, as the biggest fac-
tor. Secondary causes include human capital accumulation and low population 
growth. Migration plays a very limited role, partly because the movement of 
people has become relatively restricted, unlike the massive immigrant flows that 
characterized the pre-World War I days. Taylor does suggest, however, that the 
movement of goods may have substituted, to some extent, for the movement of 
labor.
Examining the effects of immigration and trade on a host country’s wage 
structure, Borjas et al. (1997) perform an empirical study on the U.S. labor pool 
and find that neither immigration nor trade can be counted as a sufficient explana-
tion for the widening differential between unskilled and skilled wages. However, 
in the case of native workers with less than a high school education, immigration 
has a decidedly large effect on the relative wages, more so than trade. The magni-
tude of this impact can be attributed to the flow of less-educated immigrants into 
the country, which raised the relative supply of unskilled workers (those without 
a high school education) 15 to 20 percent between 1980 and 1995. The authors 
do concede, however, that isolating the effects of immigration on the native la-
bor market is difficult, in part because immigration does not have large regional 
effects. The movement of native migrants tends to balance that of immigrants 
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especially receptive of immigrants to other regions does not provide meaningful 
results. In addition, other factors that influence the U.S. labor market are not ad-
equately controlled, and a realistic counterfactual is difficult to establish.
Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999) base their paper upon recent findings that 
immigrants have a pro-trade effect between source and host country (Head and 
Ries 1998). Data on U.S. trade and immigration between 1870 and 1910 provide 
empirical evidence for this pro-trade effect, particularly on finished foodstuffs and 
manufactures. For these two categories of goods, a 10 percent increase in migrant 
stock increased imports from the source country by 4 percent. The authors also 
find that the pro-trade effect diminished or was nonexistent for New European 
countries (eastern and southern Europe) as well as for the period between 1900 
and 1910. They hypothesize that immigrants from New Europe were unable to 
form the kind of links or relationships that would facilitate trade. They also sug-
gest that from 1900 to 1910, a significant shift in source countries occurred, which 
also weakened the pro-trade effect. In general, this study supports the Head and 
Ries paper, which focuses exclusively on U.S.–Canada trade.
Martin (2003) also focuses on post-NAFTA Mexico, though his paper is more 
descriptive than empirical. He argues that when the assumptions involved in Heck-
scher–Ohlin are relaxed, trade and migration are more likely to be complements. 
He calculates that migration to the United States will increase by 10 to 30 percent 
in the five to fifteen years following the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
creating what he terms a migration hump. He does predict, however, that migra-
tion will decrease soon after due to social and economic trends in Mexico.
Robertson (2005) takes an empirical approach to the Mexican labor mar-
ket following NAFTA. He uses wage convergence as a measure of labor market 
integration and finds that the rate of wage convergence in post-NAFTA Mexico 
did not significantly increase. Integration was not uniform, as one would expect 
if trade were the main force behind wage convergence, nor was it higher in 
manufacturing industries that received large amounts of foreign direct investment. 
Instead, integration was highest in the two border cities—Tijuana and Ciudad 
Juárez—that experienced large immigrant flows. Robertson thus concludes that 
migration plays the most significant role in labor market integration. Liberaliza-
tion in trade and capital flows alone is insufficient to induce wage equalization. 
This, of course, contradicts the Heckscher–Ohlin premise of factor price equaliza-
tion following free trade. 
Empirical Models
The starting point of our empirical investigation into the internal and external 
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(1)       Incomei=θ1+θ2Insti+θ3Geogi+θ4Tradei+θ5Migi+ei
where  Incomei is  income  per  capita  in  country  i  and  Insti,  Geogi,  Tradei, 
and  Migi    are  measures  of  country  i’s  institutions,  geography,  internation-
al  trade  volume  or  policy,  and  migration,  respectively.  As  mentioned  before,   
institutions and geography represent the internal determinants of development, 
while trade and migration are the external measures. Simple least square (OLS) 
estimates of equation (1) will serve as the benchmark for subsequent specifica-
tions.
Our second empirical specification addresses the issue of endogeneity of 
regressors. Institution, trade, and migration measures are likely to be endogenous   
due to measurement error, survey bias, and/or reverse causality.5 Consequently, 
appropriate instruments are needed for all measures. Of the various external   
instruments found in the literature, two stand out due to their widespread use:   
settler mortality as an instrument for institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robin-
son 2001),6 and predicted trade shares as an instrument for a country’s actual trade 
share (Frankel and Romer 1999) (Table 1). Since the exogeneity of the geography 
measure is indisputable (and assuming for now that migration is exogenous),   
our second specification is the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimator version of 
equation (1), with the following first-stage regressions for the two endogenous 
regressors (institutions and trade):
(2a)     Insti =a1+a2SMi+a3PTradei +a4Geogi +θ5Migi +ηi
(2b)    Tradei =b1+b2SMi+b3PTradei +b4Geogi +b5Migi +νi
where SMi measures settler mortality and PTradei is the predicted trade share in 
country i.
One problem with specifications (2a) and (2b) is that the two instruments 
used are highly correlated. As a result, they may not be able to identify the im-
pact of the endogenous regressors they are instrumenting for (Dollar and Kraay 
2003). As an alternative to the external instruments, our third specification uses 
internal instruments instead (Lewbel 1997). In particular, we use second- and 
third-order-central moments of the endogenous variables as instruments.7 In this 
specification, we not only account for the potential endogeneity of the trade and 
institution measures but of the migration measures as well.  
Finally, a shortcoming of all the above models is that they assume that all 
covariates have the same impact for all countries. In other words, the model 
ignores unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across countries. Using a panel-
data approach enables us to exploit the time dimension of the data to account External	and	Internal	Determinants	of	Development	 43
Table 1
Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Institutions 
Name Definition and source(s)
CIM (contract intensive money)
Rule of law
Defined as the ratio of noncurrency (M1 minus currency) to 
total money (M2). Compiled by R. M. Bittick, California State 
University, Dominguez Hills, based on data from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (1998).
Measures the quality of contract enforcement, police and 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence, aver-
age for 1996, 1998, and 2000. From Kaufmann et al. (2003)
Trade
Name Definition and source(s)
Trade share
Import tariffs
Imports plus exports relative to GDP. From PWT Mark 6.1 
(Heston et al. 2002).
Import duties as a percentage of total imports. From World 
Bank (2003), author’s calculations.
Geography 
Name Definition and source(s)
Distance equator
(relative distance from the equator)
Calculated as distance from the equator, divided by 90. From  
Gallup et al. (1998) and Hall and Jones (1999).
Migration 
Name Definition and source(s)
Remittances share Ratio of remittances to GNP. From World Bank (2000).
Foreign population share Ratio of foreign born to total population. From United Nations 
(1994).
Instrumental variables (external) for 2SLS regressions 
Name Definition and source(s)
Settler mortality
Predicted trade share
Mortality rate of European colonialists in the 1500s. From 
Acemoglu et al. (2001).
Obtained from bilateral gravity-type equations and controlling 
for geography. From Frankel and Romer (1999).44	 Thomas	Osang
for this unobserved country-specific heterogeneity. The following panel model is 
estimated:
(3)  Incomeit=γ1+µiλt+γ2Instit+γ3Geogit+γ4Tradeit+γ5Migit+δit
where µi and λt are country- and time-specific fixed effects, respectively. A panel-
data specification such as (3), however, is problematic if some of the right-hand-
side variables are time invariant. Thus, when using mean- or first-differencing 
to remove the unobserved time-invariant country-specific effects—the standard 
procedure in fixed effect (FE) estimation—all time-invariant covariates such as 
most geography measures are removed from the estimation equation as well. 
However, the “lost” parameter estimates can be recovered through an auxiliary 
regression of the estimated fixed effects on the time-invariant covariates. As an 
alternative to the above FE model, we also estimate a random effects (RE) model. 
Hausman specification tests guide us in the model-selection procedure. 
Data
In general, the data set covers the four decades from 1961 to 2000, though 
fewer time periods may be available for certain variables. For the cross-section 
estimates, all time-varying variables are averaged, except for the dependent vari-
able that is measured in 2000. The number of countries varies among the different 
specifications of the baseline regression model, ranging from N = 65 to N = 125.
 For the panel-data estimates, the time-varying variables are averaged over 10 
years to smooth out temporary shocks and business cycle fluctuations common 
across countries. As a result, the time dimension of the panel-data regressions 
includes four years of observations. The number of countries in the panel regres-
sions is N = 68.
Dependent Variable. Our measure of economic development (the depen-
dent variable in all regressions) is the log of per capita GDP in 2000, expressed in 
purchasing power parity-adjusted dollars (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002).
Explanatory Variables. Our main measure of institution is contract inten-
sive money (CIM), which was proposed by Clague et al. (1999). It is defined as 
the ratio of noncurrency money to total money. The basic argument for such a 
measure stems from the fact that in societies where the rules of the game and 
property and contract rights are well defined, even transactions that heavily rely 
on outside enforcement can be advantageous. Currency in this setting is used 
only in small transactions. Agents are increasingly able to invest their money in 
financial intermediaries and exploit several economic gains. Clague et al. discuss 
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case studies. They also show that CIM is a measure of contracting environment 
and not of financial development, as one might suspect. This measure is thus in 
line with the definition of institutions as noted above. Moreover, CIM is a rather 
objective measure without the many biases and measurement errors that are typi-
cal of the survey-based measures of institutions. 
While CIM is our preferred measure of institutions, we also use the rule of 
law (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2003) as an alternative measure. This vari-
able captures the extent to which agents abide by the rules of society. 
To control for the effect of geographic location and climate, we use a coun-
try’s distance from the equator (distance equator). 
We measure the extent of a country’s openness to international commerce 
in two ways: by its trade share, as defined by the ratio of exports and imports to 
GDP, and by the average import tariff, constructed as the ratio of import duties to 
imports (tariff rate).
A country’s exposure to international migration is also captured in two ways. 
First, we use the share of remittances in gross national product (remittances share) 
as an indicator of the potential benefits from emigration for the source country. Sec-
ond, we employ the ratio of foreign born to total population (foreign-born share). 
The foreign-born share can be interpreted as measure of the potentially beneficial 
impact of immigration for the destination country, either as a proxy for the size of 
the immigration surplus or the positive externalities associated with immigration. 
A third migration measure, the ratio of emigrants to total native population, can be 
interpreted as an indicator of the negative brain-drain effect of emigration for the 
source country. However, reliable emigration data are either difficult to obtain or 
not available. For this reason, we do not consider the measure in this study.8
Empirical Results
Cross-Section Estimates
To contrast our empirical results with the literature, we first estimate the cross-
section specification used by Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004); see Table 
2A, col. 1. The measure of economic development is the log of per capita GDP, 
expressed in international prices.9 Openness to international trade is measured 
as the average trade share from 1961 to 2000. Rule of law is used to measure the 
quality of public institutions, while the measure of geography is distance from 
the equator, distance equator. While the magnitude of the coefficient estimates 
in col. 1 are not exactly identical to the ones reported in Rodrik, Subramanian, 
and Trebbi, all signs are the same and both geography and institutions are sta-
tistically significant (at the 1 percent level), while trade share is not statistically 
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Adding remittances as a covariate (col. 2) does not lead to substantive changes 
in the results. This is not surprising given that the (negative) coefficient on remit-
tances is insignificant by itself. However, the potential endogeneity of institutions, 
trade, and remittances has not been taken into consideration so far and, thus, all 
results may be biased. In column 3, we use the 2SLS estimator with settler mortal-
ity and predicted trade share as instruments while continuing to assume that the 
remittances share is exogenous. As in Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, using 
instruments for institutions and trade makes the geography measure insignificant 
without changing the lack of significance of the trade measure and the remittances 
share. When we use instrumental variables to account for the potential endogene-
ity of the remittances share (col. 4), both institutions and remittances are significant 
at 1 percent and 5 percent, respectively, while geography and trade measures 
remain insignificant. Given the negative sign on the remittances share, remittances 
appear to have a negative impact on a country’s macroeconomic performance. At 
this point, our results appear to support Rodrik et al.’s conclusion that “institutions 
rule,” with the added twist of the negative impact of remittances. Note that the 
Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test easily rejects the simple OLS models (col. 2) in 
favor of the two 2SLS estimators (cols. 3 and 4).
(Dependent variable natural log GDP per capita in 2000, in purchasing power parity dollars)
	 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
      2SLS  2SLS 
Model  OLS   OLS   IV Set A  IV Set B
 
Rule	of	law  .812  1.024  2.849  2.735
  (11.7)**  (7.14)**  (3.32)**  (3.43)**
Trade	share  .0277  .0475  –.434  –.300
  (.33)  (.43)  (–1.00)  (–.74)
Distance	equator   1.348  .736  –1.940  –1.342
  (4.05)**  (1.68)†  (–.93)  (–.69)
Remittances	share    –.0226  –.131  –.190
    (–.96)  (–1.51)  (–1.93)†
 
Observations       131  80  42  42
R-squared  .70  .48  –.55  –.41
DWH test: OLS (null) vs.  
   2SLS (P-value)      [.0008]  [.0023]
NOTES: t statistics in parentheses, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.1; P-values in square brackets; IV Set A: Settler 
mortality for rule of law; predicted trade share for trade share; IV Set B: Same as Set A plus higher-centered 
moments of remittances share.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
Table 2A
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Next, we reestimate Table 2A with different and, we believe, better measures 
of institution and trade. Instead of rule of law, we use CIM for institutions, while 
trade share is replaced with a trade policy measure, the average import tariff. In 
addition, we use internal instruments for trade and institutions rather than the 
external instrumental variables in Table 2A. The results are shown in Table 2B. 
The immediate consequence of the substitutions is a reduction in the sample size 
for the OLS estimates (cols. 5 and 6), while the 2SLS sample sizes are slightly 
larger (cols. 7 and 8). In terms of the estimates, the main differences pertain to 
the impact of geography and trade. In every specification of Table 2B, trade and 
geography measures have the expected signs and are significant at least at the 
10 percent level. The remittances share, however, is negative and insignificant 
throughout. Note that at the 10 percent level, the DWH test indicates that OLS 
(col. 6) is preferred over the 2SLS estimates. 
 So far, the skewed nature of the remittances variable has not been taken into 
consideration. As Table 3 reveals, more than half the countries listed have remit-
tance shares that are less than 1 percent of GNP. To account for this, we construct 
two remittance dummies, one for countries with shares between 1 percent and 
10 percent (medium remittances share), and one for countries with shares larger 
(Dependent variable natural log GDP per capita in 2000, in purchasing power parity dollars)
	 (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
      2SLS  2SLS 
Model  OLS   OLS   IV Set A  IV Set B
 
CIM  2.529  2.438  2.029  2.201
  (6.73)**  (5.03)**  (3.58)**  (3.80)**
Tariff	rate  –.152  –.345  –.453  –.405
  (–2.56)*  (–1.73)†  (–2.23)*  (–1.94)† 
Distance	equator   2.602  1.473  1.560  1.671
  (5.45)**  (2.02)*  (2.23)*  (2.37)*
Remittances	share    –.0263  –.0160  –.0616
    (–.57)  (–.36)  (–1.12)
Observations   86  47  47  47
R-squared  .73  .53  .52  .51
DWH test: OLS (null)  
   vs. 2SLS (P-value)      [.3173]  [.1492]
NOTES:  t  statistics  in  parentheses,  **p<0.01,  *p<0.05,  †p<0.1;  P-values  in  square  brackets;  IV  Set  A: 
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than 10 percent (high remittances share). The results are shown in Table 2C.
Once again, we compare simple OLS (col. 9) with 2SLS (col. 10), in which 
we use high-order-central moments of CIM and tariff rate as instruments. The 
results indicate that discretization of the remittances variable does not change the 
outcome. The medium- and high-share dummies aren’t significant, and both are 
negative. 
In our final cross-section model, we drop from our sample all countries with 
a remittances share of less than 1 percent of GDP since remittances are likely to 
play no role in these countries. The results are given in Table 2D. In addition to 
the OLS estimates, we report 2SLS estimates using internal instruments for institu-
tions and trade (col. 13) and institutions, trade, and remittances (col. 14). We also 
use the trade share instead of the trade policy measure. Despite the reduction in 
power (N = 24 in cols. 12–14), the coefficient estimates for institutions, geogra-
phy, and trade are statistically significant (except for trade in col. 11) and have 
the expected sign, while the coefficient estimate on the remittances share is now 
positive throughout and even statistically significant at the 10 percent level in two 
specifications (cols. 12 and 13). The insignificance of the coefficient estimate on 
(Dependent variable natural log GDP per capita in 2000, in purchasing power parity dollars)
	 (9)  (10)
    2SLS 
Model  OLS   IV Set A
 
CIM  2.102  1.773
  (4.86)**  (3.48)**
Tariff	rate  –.306  –.391
  (–1.58)  (–2.01)* 
Distance	equator   2.417  2.503
  (3.42)**  (3.67)**
Medium	remittances	share  –.238  –.228
  (–1.25)  (–1.25)
High	remittances	share  –.0920  –.0830
  (–.18)  (–.17)
Observations  64  64
R-squared  .50  .49
DWH test: OLS (null) vs.  
   2SLS (P-value)    [.3606]
NOTES: t statistics in parentheses, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.1; P-values in square brackets; IV Set A: Higher-
centered moments of CIM and tariff rate.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
Table 2C
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remittances in the last specification (col. 14) is mitigated by the fact that the DWH 
test cannot reject the OLS null hypothesis (col. 12). Thus, it appears that for the 
group of countries with substantial unilateral foreign transfers, remittances appear 
to matter for a source country’s economic development, in addition to the effects 
of trade, institutions, and geography. 
Panel Estimations
We use the panel-data approach to investigate the impact of the share of 
the foreign-born population on economic development. As previously discussed, 
the foreign-born share measures the impact of migration on destination coun-
tries, compared with the remittances share, which affects only source countries. 
Furthermore, while the remittances share is important for developing countries 
only, nontrivial foreign-born population shares can be found in both developing 
and developed countries (see Table 4 for a ranking of countries by the foreign-
born share).10 Our estimation results are given in Table 5. Column 1 contains the 
random-effects specification since the Breusch-Pagan (BP) test reveals that RE 
is strongly preferred over pooled OLS (the null hypothesis). While institutions, 
(Dependent variable natural log GDP per capita in 2000, in purchasing power parity dollars)
	 (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)
      2SLS  2SLS 
Model  OLS   OLS   IV Set A  IV Set B
 
CIM  3.85  2.16  2.351**  2.296**
  (7.42)**  (3.89)**  (4.60)  (4.56)
Trade	share   .0003  .356  .362*  .361*
  (.00)  (2.08)*  (2.05)  (2.05)
Distance	equator   3.25  3.21  3.183**  3.223**
  (6.86)**  (4.26)**  (4.58)  (4.63)
Remittances	share    .17  .166  .143
    (1.72)†  (1.86)†  (1.48)
Observations   48   25   25   25
R-squared  .83  .68  .73  .73
DWH test: OLS (null) vs.
   2SLS (P-value)     [.2279]  [.4877]
NOTES: Sample is restricted to countries in which remittances share of GDP exceeds 1 percent; t statistics 
in parentheses, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.1; P-values in square brackets; IV Set A: Higher-centered moments 
of CIM and trade share; IV Set B: Higher-centered moments of CIM, trade share, and remittances share.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
Table 2D
Cross-Section Regressions IV: High Remittances Sample
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      Mean
Rank  Country   1970–98
  1  Lebanon  .312
  2  Yemen, Rep.  .263
  3  Samoa  .245
  4  Eritrea  .196
  5  Tonga  .172
  6  Jordan  .170
  7  Cape Verde  .169
  8  Albania  .131
  9  Egypt, Arab Rep.  .075
10  Dominica  .072
11  Morocco  .067
12  St. Kitts and Nevis  .065
13  Burkina Faso  .064
14  El Salvador  .057
15  Jamaica  .051
16  Haiti  .048
17  Pakistan  .046
18  Benin  .045
  Sri Lanka  .045
  Belize  .045
21  Vanuatu  .044
22  Comoros  .042
23  Tunisia  .041
24  Dominican Republic  .039
  St. Vincent and the Grenadines  .039
26  Mali  .038
27  Grenada  .035
28  St. Lucia  .031
29  Sudan  .027
30  Croatia  .025
31  Turkey  .023
32  Macedonia, FYR  .021
33  Senegal  .020
34  Bangladesh  .019
35  Somalia  .017
  Nicaragua  .017
  Nepal  .017
38  Algeria  .014
39  Togo  .013
40  India  .011
      Mean
Rank  Country    1970–98
  Honduras  .011
42  Nigeria  .010
43  Guatemala  .009
44  Barbados  .008
  Mexico  .008
46  Seychelles  .006
   Philippines  .006
  Colombia  .006
  Mauritania  .006
50  Armenia  .005
  Oman  .005
52  Cameroon  .004
  Niger  .004
  Ecuador  .004
  Cambodia  .004
56  Peru  .003
RanCountDjibouti  .003
  Mongolia  .003
  Guinea-Bissau  .003
60  Costa Rica  .002
  Panama  .002
  Indonesia  .002
  Guinea  .002
  Trinidad and Tobago  .002
  Poland  .002
66  Madagascar  .001
  Sao Tome and Principe  .001
  Belarus  .001
  Ghana  .001
  China  .001
  Korea, Rep.  .001
  Rwanda  .001
  Moldova  .001
  Brazil  .001
  Paraguay  .001
  Guyana  .001
  Kyrgyz Republic  .001
  Bolivia  .001
  Congo, Dem. Rep.  .001
Table 3
Ranking of Countries by Remittances-to-GNP Ratio
NOTE: Countries with no remittances were omitted.
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              Mean 
Rank          Country  1965  1975  1985  1990  1965–90
  1  United Arab Emirates  .842  .675  .663  .900  .770
  2  Kuwait  .529  .524  .594  .715  .590
  3  Qatar  .515  .588  .586  .633  .580
  4  Macau  .674  .601  .536  .446  .564
  5  Hong Kong  .466  .430  .405  .400  .425
  6  Israel  .560  .416  .339  .309  .406
  7  Jordan  .362  .261  .261  .265  .287
  8  Bahrain  .202  .213  .329  .351  .274
  9  Luxembourg  .158  .192  .270  .316  .234
10  Oman  .080  .158  .319  .335  .223
11  Singapore  .282  .235  .186  .155  .215
12  Australia  .179  .195  .219  .234  .206
13  Cote D’Ivoire  .024  .218  .261  .292  .199
14  Saudi Arabia  .065  .115  .285  .257  .181
15  New Zealand  .146  .158  .151  .155  .152
16  Switzerland  .129  .162  .140  .160  .148
17  Canada  .017  .152  .151  .155  .118
18  Taiwan  .171  .114  .085  .079  .112
19  Gambia  .118  .100  .094  .112  .106
20  France  .090  .105  .108  .104  .102
  Libya  .043  .098  .143  .123  .102
22  Lebanon  .080  .076  .104  .122  .096
23  Belgium  .055  .078  .090  .090  .078
24  Argentina  .110  .083  .060  .052  .076
25  Malawi  .075  .056  .040  .121  .073
26  Sweden  .050  .069  .078  .089  .071
  Pakistan  .106  .054  .065  .061  .071
28  Zimbabwe  .050  .060  .078  .079  .067
29  Somalia  .004  .096  .093  .072  .066
30  Ireland  .032  .053  .080  .093  .064
  Puerto Rico  .023  .043  .099  .092  .064
  Iran  .091  .044  .059  .062  .064
  Syria  .061  .060  .068  .066  .064
34  United States  .050  .054  .070  .079  .063
35  Malaysia  .088  .072  .047  .042  .062
  Gabon  .040  .040  .078  .088  .062
37  Zambia  .092  .063  .045  .041  .060
38  Togo  .087  .062  .047  .041  .059
39  Venezuela  .063  .057  .061  .053  .058
  Costa Rica  .023  .014  .043  .153  .058
41  United Kingdom  .045  .056  .062  .065  .057
42  Burundi  .048  .038  .070  .061  .055
  Uganda  .109  .077  .013  .019  .055
44  Congo  .044  .047  .052  .059  .050
  Poland  .070  .053  .040  .036  .050
                                                                                                                (Continued	on	page	52)
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              Mean 
Rank          Country  1965  1975  1985  1990  1965–90
46  Netherlands  .029  .025  .054  .078  .047
47  Zaire  .052  .062  .031  .028  .043
48  Nigeria  .002  .161  .003  .003  .042
  Liberia  .031  .039  .046  .050  .042
50  Paraguay  .028  .037  .048  .043  .039
51  Sierra Leone  .024  .032  .044  .050  .037
  South Africa  .048  .038  .029  .030  .037
53  Austria  .017  .028  .036  .059  .035
54  Tanzania  .041  .040  .025  .023  .032
  Norway  .020  .027  .037  .044  .032
  Senegal  .047  .037  .017  .025  .032
57  Denmark  .021  .026  .035  .041  .031
58  Sudan  .019  .019  .049  .033  .030
59  Honduras  .022  .014  .020  .056  .028
  Cameroon  .034  .029  .024  .024  .028
61  Ghana  .058  .029  .014  .009  .027
62  Burkina Faso  .008  .017  .034  .047  .026
63  Nepal  .033  .023  .017  .021  .024
64  Turkey  .029  .022  .019  .020  .023
65  Italy  .016  .018  .023  .027  .021
  Greece  .008  .013  .030  .032  .021
67  Iraq  .003  .009  .033  .028  .018
  Mali  .023  .024  .014  .012  .018
69  Guatemala  .011  .006  .014  .029  .015
  Portugal  .007  .017  .021  .014  .015
71  India  .019  .015  .012  .010  .014
72  Algeria  .016  .014  .009  .015  .013
  Yugoslavia  .008  .010  .017  .017  .013
  Korea  .005  .008  .017  .021  .013
75  Spain  .009  .009  .010  .018  .011
  Kenya  .017  .012  .008  .007  .011
  Romania  .018  .011  .007  .006  .011
78  Chile  .012  .011  .007  .008  .009
  Niger  .004  .003  .015  .015  .009
  Brazil  .009  .011  .009  .008  .009
  Thailand  .014  .010  .007  .006  .009
  Bangladesh  .009  .010  .008  .007  .009
83  Japan  .006  .006  .006  .007  .006
  Mexico  .005  .004  .006  .008  .006
85  Ethiopia  .001  .002  .003  .016  .005
  Czechoslovakia  .004  .004  .005  .006  .005
  Egypt  .007  .005  .004  .003  .005
88  Colombia  .004  .004  .003  .003  .004
89  Myanmar  .002  .001  .002  .002  .002
Table 4 (continued)
Ranking of Countries by Share of Foreign-Born Population
NOTE: List shows countries reporting these data to the U.N.
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trade, and geography coefficients are significant and have the expected sign, the 
most important finding pertains to the foreign-born share, which is positive and 
significant. 
Interestingly, the RE result on the foreign-born share is not robust when we 
estimate an FE model instead of the RE model (col. 2). While institutions and trade 
continue to be significant (and have the expected signs), the foreign-born coef-
ficient estimate is now much smaller in size and insignificant.11 However, given 
the small time-series dimension (T = 4), the FE model suffers from overfitting and 
the corresponding decline in degrees of freedom.12 In the next two columns, we 
thus revert to the FE specification but use different sets of instruments to account 
for the potential endogeneity of the institutions, trade, and foreign-born share. 
Initially (col. 3), we use internal instruments only for the institution and trade vari-
ables, while in the final specification (col. 4), we add internal instruments for the 
foreign-born share. The random effects/instrumental variables (RE-IV) estimates 
(Dependent variable natural log GDP per capita in 2000, in purchasing power parity dollars)
	 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
      RE-IV  RE-IV 
Estimation method  RE   FE   Set A  Set B
 
CIM  1.377  .982  .755  .814
  (6.43)**  (4.50)**  (2.17)*  (2.36)*
Tariff	rate  –.0706  –.0684  –.0653  –.0624
  (–3.60)**  (–3.52)**  (–2.85)**  (–2.73)**
Distance	equator  3.127    3.419  3.404
  (7.40)**    (7.62)**  (7.61)**
Foreign-born	share  .100  .0257  .111  .117
  (2.09)*  (.48)  (2.23)*  (1.87)†
Observations  175  175  175  175
Number of countries  68  68  68  68
R-squared    .33
BP test: pooled (null) vs.  
   RE (P-value)  [.0000]     
Hausman test: RE (null) vs. 
   FE (P-value)    [.0000]   
Hausman test: RE (null) vs. 
   IV RE (P-value)      [.1613]  [.1783]
NOTES: z statistics in parentheses, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.1; P-values in square brackets; RE-IV Set A: 
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confirm the finding from the simple RE model (col. 1), namely that the foreign-
born share has a positive impact on macroeconomic performance. Overall, the 
differences in the estimated coefficients between the RE and RE-IV models are 
small, with a small preference for the RE model (according to the Hausman test, 
we cannot reject the RE model at the 10 percent level). 
Conclusions
To our knowledge, this paper represents the first attempt to integrate mea-
sures of migration into a framework that analyzes the economic impact of the 
so-called deep determinants of development: institution, geography, and inter-
national trade. Using both cross-section and panel-data estimation methods, we 
find that both measures of migration used in this study—remittances as a share of 
GNP (top half of receiving countries) and foreign-born relative to the total popu-
lation—have a positive impact on economic development even after controlling 
for institutions, geography, and trade. The findings go beyond establishing corre-
lations. Using instrumental variable methods to counter the estimation bias of the 
three potentially endogenous covariates (institutions, trade, and migration), the 
findings provide evidence for a causal link between external measures (migration 
and trade) and per capita income. 
In terms of their economic impact, institutions appear to matter the most. 
This is especially true if we measure the quality of institutions by the extent of 
contract-intensive money in the economy, which has a high elasticity with respect 
to per capita income. Openness to trade (when measured as the average import 
tariff) and migration (when measured as the foreign-born share) exhibit point 
elasticities that are more than ten times smaller than the one for institutions. The 
(positive) economic impact of geography appears to be rather small. 
This study can be extended in several directions. First, better measures of 
migration for both source and destination countries are desirable. As mentioned 
before, the migration measures used here cannot account for the negative brain 
drain or the potentially positive brain gain of migration in countries with liberal 
emigration rules. Similarly, the destination-country measure (foreign-born share) 
cannot differentiate between the positive and negative externalities associated 
with immigration. In addition to the “average” effect captured in this study, iden-
tifying the size of both positive and negative migration effects for the destination 
country would be desirable from a policymaking perspective. Second, method-
ologies could be improved. In addition to the extremes of random- and fixed-ef-
fects estimations, a middle-ground panel-data estimator such as Hausman–Taylor 
(1981) could prove to be a superior specification and, thus, may produce less-




































Growth:	Theory	and	Evidence,”	Journal of Development Economics	64:	275–89.
Borjas,	G.	J.,	R.	B.	Freeman,	L.	F.	Katz,	J.	DiNardo,	and	J.	M.	Abowd	(1997),	“How	Much		














Trade	in	the	Late	Nineteenth	and	Early	Twentieth	Centuries,”	Journal of Economic History	59	
(December):	1043–62.
Easterly,	William,	and	Ross	Levine	(2003),	“Tropics,	Germs,	and	Crops:	How	Endowments	Influ-












Output	Per	Worker	Than	Others?”	Quarterly Journal of Economics	114	(February):	83–116.
Hanson,	G.	H.,	and	M.	J.	Slaughter	(2002),	“Labor-Market	Adjustment	in	Open	Economies:	Evi-








































of Population and Family Economics,	ed.	M.	R.	Rosenzweig	and	O.	Stark	(Amsterdam:	Elsevier	
Science),	851–87.
Robertson,	R.	(2005),	“Has	NAFTA	Increased	Labor	Market	Integration	Between	the	United	










Integration,”	Brookings Papers on Economic Activity	1:	1–118.
Smith,	J.	P.,	and	B.	Edmonston,	ed.	(1997),	The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and 
Fiscal Effects of Immigration	(Washington,	D.C.:	National	Academies	Press,	May).External	and	Internal	Determinants	of	Development	 59
Stark,	Oded,	Christian	Helmenstein,	and	Alexia	Prskawetz	(1998),	“Human	Capital	Deple-
tion,	Human	Capital	Formation,	and	Migration:	A	Blessing	or	a	‘Curse’?”	Economic Letters	60:	
363–67.
Taylor,	A.	M.	(1995),	“Growth	and	Convergence	in	the	Asia–Pacific	Region:	On	the	Role	of	
Openness,	Trade,	and	Migration,”	NBER	Working	Paper	no.	5276	(Cambridge,	Mass.:	National	
Bureau	of	Economic	Research,	September).
United	Nations	(1994),	U.N.	Population	Division,	New	York.
World	Bank	(2000),	Global	Development	Finance	CD-ROM	(Washington,	D.C.:	World	Bank).
———	(2003),	World	Development	Indicators	CD-ROM	(Washington,	D.C.:	World	Bank).